Introduction
Modal logic is part of second-order logic. It can be identi ed with fragments of monadic second-order logic using special axioms or formulas. The use of modal logic rather than classical predicate logic (1 st or higher order) has to be defended. Apart from the motivations of modal logics and their suitedness to intuitive thinking { something which puts modal logic indeed on a par with predicate logic { the main motive for applying modal logics is actually the belief of almost guaranteed decidability. But general results on decidability have failed to appear except for the eld of extensions of K4. For logics containing K4 Kit Fine and M. Zakharyaschev have broken ground towards general decidability results via establishing fmp. For applications, usually more than one operator is needed, so their results are of limited value there. Results for polymodal logics have hitherto not been obtained. This is on the one hand connected with the fact that even for modal logics with one operator we lack su ciently general results (with the exception of K4) but is also connected to the fact that several operators o er easier alleys to incompleteness and undecidability. 13; 14] has identi ed the reason for this twofold connection. He rst nds undecidable polymodal logics by using known undecidable structures and then simulating them in the language of mono-modal logic. But his examples are quite complex and so one might still hope that some simple and yet useful class of polymodal logics is decidable. The author admits to have had such hopes with regards to the family of logics determined by universal sentences.
We will see that such hopes are unjusti ed. Polymodal logics are not just alleys, they are highways into undecidability. There are plenty of quite simple undecidable logics and all candidates of a natural, non-trivial class of decidable logics have been successively destroyed by negative examples. This paper is organized as follows. In the rst section we discuss Sahlqvist's Theorem and propose a special quanti er complexity hierarchy for these logics which we call the Sahlqvist Hierarchy. Then follows a section in which we introduce a number of undecidable Sahlqvist logics of low complexity. In the third section we discuss the simulation of polymodal logics in monomodal logics and apply this technique to the previously established logics. It follows that there are monomodal undecidable Sahlqvist logics of complexity 2, corresponding roughly to rst-order formulae of type 89. In the last section we discuss several rami cations of this theme.
This work continues the work of Thomason and uses techniques of 5] as well as 7] on pushing up properties. It also draws on an array of results the author has obtained together with Carsten Grefe, which are reported in 4]. Only after compsing this essay I have learnt that V. Shehtman has already used Thue-processes to obtain undecidability results; his results, however, have been published only in Russian. I wish to thank Herr Grefe as well as Frank Wolter, Rajeev Gor e and Valentin Shehtman for many discussions.
The Sahlqvist Hierarchy
Recall from 9] the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Sahlqvist) Let T be a modal formula which is equivalent to a conjunction of formulae of the form m (T 1 ! T 2 ) where m 2 !, T 2 is positive and T 1 is obtained from propositional variables and constants in such a way that no positive occurrence of a variable is in a subformula of the form U 1 _ U 2 or U 1 which is itself in the scope of some . Then T is e ectively equivalent to a rst-order formula and K(T) is d-persistent.
Throughout this essay all logics considered will be Sahlqvist logics. These logics have the advantage to be complete with respect to Kripke semantics. The conditions the axioms impose on the Kripke frames are elementary.
In 6], the elementary conditions corresponding to Sahlqvist formulae have been characterized. It has recently become popular to look at algorithms computing rst-order equivalents. It should be emphasized that contrary to what is stated in the literature the method has always been constructive. The word e ective expresses this. Any doubts about the e ectiveness of this translation should have been removed by the algorithm in 5], reproduced in 6], in which pairs h (w); Pi are considered where (w) is a rst-order formula with n free variables and P an n-sequence of modal formulae. Relative to a class X this pair denotes the fact that (w) is equivalent to the second-order formula (9p) V i n P i (w i ). For di erent classes di erent rule calculi are developed which derive pairs which are valid in X under this interpretation. The calculus for the union of the class of Kripke-frames with the class of descriptive frames allows to prove Sahlqvist's Theorem and also derive in tandem the corresponding rst-order properties. (For details consult 6].) Sahlqvist's Theorem can be generalized straightforwardly to logics with several operators, a fact which is perhaps not so well-known. We will state the theorem in it's general form below.
For ease of understanding the workings of the Sahlqvist theorem we begin with the classi cation of the corresponding rst-order conditions. Given that we are in the language of m-modal logics we have m modal operators i (i m) and their duals i and on the Kripke frames m di erent binary accessibility relations < i . The standard rst-order language for talking about Kripke frames uses these symbols, the usual connectives and rstorder quanti ers over worlds plus equality. Rather than using the standard quanti ers we use their restricted counterparts. They are de ned as follows (8y > i x) := (8y)(x < i y: ! : ) (9y > i x) := (9y)(x < i y^ ) From atomic formulae x = y, x < i y we can never actually produce variable free formulae with these quanti ers. There will necessarily be at least one free variable. We are interested in formulae where there is exactly one, which we treat as implicitly universally quanti ed (by an unrestricted quanti er, of course). The rst-order language with restricted quanti ers will here be referred to as R. We assume also that R has the symbols t and f, standing for the true and the false proposition.
Particular formulas in R are the constant formulae. A formula is called constant if it is composed from the constant atomic formulae t and f. In contrast to standard predicate logic constant formulae are non-trivial. The following are constant formulae which are non-reducible.
(9y > 1 x) t; (8y > 1 x)(9z > 2 y) t Constant formulae correspond to constant propositions in modal logic, in our examples 1 > and 1 2 >. In R there exists no equivalent of prenex normal forms. In an R-formula a variable is inherently universal if it is bound by a universal quanti er which itself is not in the scope of an existential quanti er. A formula is positive if it is composed from atomic formulae and constant formulae using only^, _ and the quanti ers. Notice that the occurring constant subformulae need not be positive. The following is proved in 6].
Theorem 2 An R-formula is Sahlqvist i it is equivalent to an R-formula which is positive and in which every non-constant atomic subformula contains at least one inherently universal variable.
We introduce a notion of a Sahlqvist Hierarchy that is supposed to classify the complexity of a logic in terms of the quanti er alternations that occur.
Sq 0 is reserved for the constant formulae. In a formula of type Sq n , n > 0, at most n?1 alternations of quanti er type (8, 9) occur, with quanti ers in constant subformulae being ignored. This deviates from the standard de nition in the fact that we ignore the complexity of constant subformulae. Of course, one can introduce a standard quanti er complexity measure. However, we will propose the following notation. The symbol Sq n (+k) means that the formula is Sq k+n if all quanti er alternations are counted, but merely Sq n if the quanti ers of constant subformulae are ignored. For example
is Sq 1 (+1). For the rest of this paper, we will not use this ner distinction except for formulas of level Sq n (+0) which we also call strictly Sq n .
The following is a di erent formulation of Sahlqvist 
The operator in the consequent does not introduce an existential quanti er. All logics considered in the sequel will be of complexity Sq 2 , most will be of complexity Sq 1 , so universal rst-order modulo ignoring the constant subformulae. Within Sq 1 we can discern some narrower classes which are of interest in their own right. First, the subframe logics of 2] and 15]. Elementary subframe logics are strictly Sq 1 ; this means that they are Sq 1 even with constant subformulae being counted. Another class are the deterministic logics; they are expressible in R without the help of disjunction { except for the constant subformulae, which may contain disjunctions. The intersection of the two classes, the deterministic subframe logics, are exactly those logics which can be axiomatized by Horn-formulae in the standard rst-order logic. In R they are of the form A: , where A is a pre x of universal quanti ers and a single, positive atomic formula { that is, a formula of th ekind x = y or x < j y, j m. We call the class of logics axiomatizable by Horn-formulae Horn-logics. We have the following inclusion diagram. This equivalence is correct.For if a frame satis es (8x) (x)_(8x) (x) then it also satis es one of the two, say (8x) (x). Thus it satis es (8x)(8y > j x) (y) for all j and consequently k for all k. For the converse assume F satis es all k . Take a world w 2 F. Then for an in nite number of k 2 ! we have
Let the rst be the case. Denote by G be the subframe generated by w in F. Then G j = (8x) (x). Consequently,
This holds for all generated subframes, and so it holds for F as well, since (x); (x) are restricted. Secondly, k 2 Sq n . Two cases need to be distinguished. First case is n = 0. Then k is constant and so in Sq 0 as well. Second case n > 0. Then since the formula begins with a universal quanti er and (8y > j x) is a chain of universal quanti ers, the complexity does not rise. a
Some Simple Undecidable Logics
In the domain of polymodal logics there are already some known undecidable logics. One example is the logic with three operators each of which satis es S5 and which commute pairwise. This logic arises from modelling 3-variable fragments of predicate logic with modal operators. The axioms are Sq 2 . Here we use an extremely simple tool, that of a Thue-process. The algebraic equivalent of this process is known as the word problem in semigroups.
Consider a nite presentation of a semigroup via a set G = fg 1 ; : : :; g m g of generators and a set T = ft i u i ji 2 ng of relations among these generators.
The generators plus equations form a nite presentation of the semigroup There are T over two symbols such that`T`b sg r s' is undecidable. It is undecidable whether or not`T`b sg r s' is decidable for given T over two symbols.
Based on the free semigroup we can form the canonical Thue-frame. Its underlying set of worlds is exactly the elements of F SG (G)=T { which can also be seen as equivalence classes of terms under { and the relations are t < i u i u t g i . This construction is actually quite known in automatic theorem proving for modal logic. We abbreviate this frame by F(T). We can determine the logic of this frame. To do this let us introduce some notation.
A term t in the language of semigroups based on g 1 ; : : :; g m can be seen as a complex modal operator based on m simple modalities, 1 ; : : :; m . De ne g i P = i P; (t g i ) P = t i P For the empty word we agree to let P = P. Analogously, t is de ned. We have t P: $ ::t :P. Now the postulates for the logic simulating a Thue-process will be the following. (p _ q): $ : p _ q (p^q): $ p^ q This allows for rather special normal forms. Given a formula P, we write it with i , i ,^, _ and : in such a way that : occurs only before variables. This is always possible. Now,^can be moved out of the scope of any i , i and _, so that P can be written as a conjunction of conjunction-free formulae. Let Q be such a formula. Now _ can be moved out of the scope of any i and i , and occurrences of i can be changed into i . Thus Q is reduced to the following form In that case we have a conjunct s j q j in the antecedent and a disjunct r i q j in the consequent. Since we can let q j be true at a single world, the antecedent then sets a s j -path to this world and the consequent says that all r i -paths (i. e. the one and only r i -path) must end there. Thus, the two paths must be identical. There are nitely axiomatizable bimodal logics of complexity Sq 1 which are undecidable. It is not decidable whether nitely axiomatizable polymodal logics of complexity at least Sq 1 are decidable.
There are, however, many more consequences concerning logics simulating Thue-processes. Notice rst of all that T only marginally exceeds the class of Sq 1 -logics. We can namely provide a di erent axiomatization as follows. Instead of r s, an axiom which guarantees the existence and identity of r successors with s successors, we are going to add the axiom r " s " r p^s q: ! :r q^s p which only asserts that the r successors and the s successors if they exist must be identical. In presence of the D axiom for both relations, this axiom is equivalent in strength to r s. The Proof. Take T for an undecidable Thue-process T. This is a Horn-logic.
Then T is globally undecidable and so by the previous lemma T must be undecidable. The postulates are readily checked to be Horn-de nable. a These logics are characterized by universal, deterministic (i. e. _-free) and positive R-formulae. Now it is not decidable whether T a`U for two Thue-processes T; U simply because otherwise we would be able to decidè T`r s'. Thus it is not decidable whether T = U , and, similarly, it is undecidable whether T = U . This has the following consequence.
Theorem 13 It is undecidable for two Horn-theories T; U based on at least three relations whether T a`U. a For elementary logics this shows quite simply that it is undecidable whether two universal theories with relational symbols have the same models.
Simulating Polymodal Logics
The results obtained so far have established results for polymodal logics with two or three operators at least. Generally, it would be preferrable if we could also prove some (un-)decidability results for mono-modal logics. The way to obtain (mainly negative) results is by simulating frames with several modalities by frames using a single modality. This technique was established by 13]. Our simulations are di erent but similar in spirit.
Suppose now that we have a frame hf; <; Ji for the bimodal language with operators , . We then construct a monomodal frame hf sim ; 6i for the monomodal language based on the operator and it's dual . As in Thomason's original example, the original set of points must be blown up and a single point must be replaced by several copies. What is important in the construction is that the copies of the point must be distinguishable from each other by certain constant formulae. If that is so, the simulation is rather straightforward. Thomason's construction is more economical than ours; he needs two copies per point, the number of points in the simulating frame is exactly 2 ]f + 1, whereas in our construction it is 5 ]f, but it is easy to see that it can be reduced to 3 ]f + 2. However, our construction has the advantage of being symmetrical in the operators and so we only need to consider one case out of two in each proof. Moreover, if we ignore the complexity of constant formulae { which we have chosen to do { then no di erence in expenses will arise. Each point of the frame will be replaced by the following frame r = hr; < r i, where r = fa; b; i; p; tg. ( We use a x to denote an irre exive point and a to denote a re exive point.) On f sim we de ne a relation 6 as the union of three relations, < r , < and < . The rst derives from the blowing up of points by the frame r, the second codes < and the third one codes J. 6 = < r < < < r = fhx ; x ij < r g < = fhx a ; y i ijx < yg < = fhx b ; y i ijx J yg 
The sets f ; 2 r, are de nable in any of the so constructed frames by a formula without variables, hence they are always internal. Namely, consider the following formulae. Proof. We begin with T. x 2 ? implies = t because otherwise x < r x and thus x 6 x for some 2 r. On the other hand, x t sees no points via < and < . This shows the correctness of T. Now for P. Clearly, if x 2 2 ?, then by similar arguments = p; t. Conversely, if = p; t then x 2 2 ?. Now P = 2 ?^:T and from the previous considerations on T it follows that P de nes f p . Now for A. Let x 2 ?. Then x 6 y t for some y 2 f, by the correctness of T. By de nition of 6 this can only hold if x < r y t and so = a or = p. Since A = ?^:P this proves the correctness of A. Now B = P. Let x 2 P. Then, by the correctness of P, x 6 y p for some y 2 f. By de nition of 6, x < r y p and so = b. Finally, x 2 I i x 6 2 T, x 6 2 B and x 6 2 T. The rst and the second are equivalent to 6 = t; b. Since T de nes f a f p , the third condition is equivalent to 6 = a; p. Hence I = f i . a
Now that we can simulate frames and { in e ect { also polymodal algebras, we translate polymodal formulas into mono-modal formulas. Lemma 16 (Simulation) For all biframes F and all bimodal formulas P F j = P , F sim j = I ! P sim Proof. Simple induction on P. a We are now introducing a map (?) s : E(K K) ! E(K) de ned as K K(X) s = K(X s ), where X s = fI ! P sim jP 2 Xg. As this stands, the de nition of (?) s depends on a concrete axiomatization for the bimodal logic. We will however show that the choice of axioms is immaterial. Also, we de ne an unsimulation of a mono-modal logic to be u = fPjI ! P sim 2 g.
While we cannot simply take the simulation of a polymodal logic to be the set of simulations of its theorems (this set happens not to be closed under the rules), the unsimulation indeed yields a logic, no matter what is.
Theorem 17 Let be a monomodal logic. Then u is a bimodal logic.
Proof. It has to be shown that u is closed under substitution, modus ponens and the two rules of necessitation. Substitution. Let P 2 u , that is, I ! P sim 2 . Take now a substitution and de ne sim (p) = (p) sim . Then (I ! P sim ) sim = I ! (P ) sim as can be veri ed by induction. Since is closed under substitution, (I ! P ) sim 2 and so P 2 u . Modus Ponens. Let P; P ! Q 2 u , that is, I ! P sim ; I ! (P ! Q) sim 2 . Then, as (P ! Q) sim = P sim ! Q sim we also have I ! :P sim ! Q sim 2 and thus I ! Q sim 2 , by which Q 2 u . Necessitation. Assume P 2 u . Then I ! P sim 2 . Hence (I ! P sim ) 2 , and then also A ! (I ! P sim ) 2 , and, nally, ( P) sim 2 , by which I ! ( P) sim 2 , and so P 2 u . Analogously for . a
This theorem tells us that we can simulate proofs of the bimodal calculus in the monomodal calculus and thus that the the map (?) s is independent from the axiomatization of the logic. For if K(X) = K(Y ) for di erent sets X; Y , then a proof of Q 2 K(X) for Q 2 Y can be simulated so that Q s 2 K(X s ) and likewise a proof of Q 2 K(Y ) for Q 2 X can be simulated. It follows that K(X s ) = K(Y s ). Now that this is established we come to another important property of the simulation, namely its faithfulness.
Take two di erent bimodal logics ; . Their classes of general biframes must be di erent, and so are then the classes of the simulating frames. The simulating frames may not be all frames for these logics, but they discriminate them nevertheless.
The next question to be addressed is the fate of Sahlqvist formulae under simulation. The following is easily checked.
Theorem 18 If P is a Sahlqvist formula then P s = I ! P sim is equivalent to a Sahlqvist formula.
Proof. Let P = A ! B be Sahlqvist. P s = I ! (A ! B) sim is equivalent to I^A sim : ! :B sim . Clearly, if C is constant, so is C sim . Now if S is strongly positive, so is S sim . Namely, the translation of box is a constant restricted box.
( P) sim (A ! (I ! P sim )) ( P) sim (B ! (I ! P sim )) Thus since A; B as well as I are constant, S sim is composed from constant formulae and variables with^and constant restricted . Since A is composed from strongly positive and constant formulae with the help of^; _ and then so is A sim . Finally, B sim is positive, thus proving the theorem. a
This being the case we can actually derive the elementary condition associated with simulation of a special Sahlqvist formula. To this end de ne the following constant R-formulae.
T(x) = (8y > x) f P(x) = (8y > x)(8z > y) f^(9y > x) t A(x) = (9y > x)(8z > y) f^(9y > x)(9z > y) t B(x) = (9y > x) (8z > y)(8u > z) f^(9z > y) t] I(x) = (9y > x) t^(8y > x)(9z > y) t( 8y > x) (8z > y)(8u > z) f^(9z > y) t]
Now de ne the simulation of a rst-order property inductively as follows. Notice that we excluded a clause simulating x < y, x J y. The reason is to show a slight twist in this simulation. Namely, x 6 y is equivalent to (9w > x)(w = y). This existential quanti er does not show up in the Sahlqvist Hierarchy because x< y as well as x J y are atomic formulae. But the simulation of these formulae do introduce an existential quanti er. So, even when the original formula was Sq 1 , the simulated formula might turn out to be Sq 2 . This is the case exactly if the original formula uses atomic formulae of the type x < y, x J y. Our undecidable logics are of this kind.
We summarize this in the following statement.
Theorem 19 If P is in Sq n and n is even, then I ! P sim is in Sq n as well. If, however, n is odd, then I ! P sim is in Sq n+1 . a
The process of simulation can be iterated to simulate any number of relations. The level in the Sahlqvist Hierarchy does not rise more than one, however. If n is even, the one step simulation remains at that level; if n is odd, the level goes one up and stays there. This iterated simulation is nevertheless from an intuitive point of view quite complex. However, by rede ning r it is possible to achieve a simultaneous simulation of all operators. For example, with three operators, we take the following r. contain no i it might be reasonable to believe that a calculus based on nondescending formulae of this type is actually decidable because by reasoning forward from a formula Q we cannot increase the nestings of i and not decrease the nestings of i , so that when we proved Q inconsistent by deriving a contradiction P; :P it seems prima facie plausible that we can give good a priori estimates for P (and the other intermediate formulae). But such reasoning is unjusti ed. The logics T are axiomatized by non-descending formulae free of any i . One might consider whether a requirement that in a formula A ! B A must have strictly greater modal depth than B would ensure decidability. Again, the answer is negative. The reasoning is rather interesting. It is based on the following theorem.
Theorem 22 Suppose that is a globally decidable m-modal logic. Then for any and any k 2 ! the extension (2 k ? ! ) is globally decidable as well.
Let us see rst its consequences. Suppose that for global decidability of a logic it is su cient to require (among other) that for any axiom A ! B the modal depth of A exceeds that of B (or exceeds f(B) for some function f). Take any logic axiomatized by formulae A ! B where the other postulates are met but not the requirements on depth. Observe then that A ! B: $ :(A^ k ? ! B)^(A^ k > ! B) so that if A^ k > ! B meets the other criteria, it also meets the depth requirements if k is large. In this way we split all axioms of and add only one half and have global decidability. By the above theorem, however, adding the other halves will not destroy global decidability. So we can push decidability up. However, in this case this amounts to pushing undecidability down, destroying any of the decidability criteria based on complexity conditions at once. Now we prove the theorem. The proof is based on the observation that for any n 2 ! there is a nite set S(n) of substitutions such that for any nite set of generators fa 1 ; : : :; a n g for the set algebra F of a re ned frame F = hf; Fi for the valuation : p i 7 ! a i and any point x 2 f (y) hF; ; xi j = f k ? ! j 2 S(n)g , F j = k ? ! For then it holds that for all ; based on the sentence letters p 1 ; : : :
For a proof just check all models on one-generated re ned frames F where the underlying set algebra is generated by the values of (p 1 ); : : :; (p n ). By a theorem of 10], it is enough to show the theorem in the class of re ned frames.
Now on to the proof of (y). From right to left holds for any set S(n).
So the really interesting part is from left to right. We begin by constructing the S(n). Consider the subframe C based on the set C of all points x such that hF; xi j = k ?. By induction on k it can be shown that C is nite, bounded in size by a function depending only on n (and k). C is a generated subframe hence re ned. C is therefore a full frame since it is nite. Consider now the valuation on C. It is possible to show that any set T C can be presented as the extension of T (a 1 ; : : :; a n ) under for a suitable T which is of modal degree 2k (see 7]). Collect in S(n) all substitutions : p i 7 ! i (p 1 ; : : :; p n ) for formulas of depth 2k. S(n) is nite. We show ()) of (y) with these sets. To that end, assume that F 2 k ? ! . Then there exists and x such that hF; ; xi j = k ?^:
Then x 2 C and so we have by the fact that C is a generated subframe hC; ; xi j = :
Put : p i 7 ! (p i ) . Then ( ) = ( ) whence hC; ; xi j = :
And so hF; ; xi j = k ?^: This demonstrates (y) and so the theorem is proved. a
There are re nements which are still unsolved. Call a formula a path containment formula if it is of the form r p ! s p. This states that the set of points reachable by r-paths is included in the set of points reachable by s-paths. for undecidable T cannot be globally decidable.
Question. Are all polymodal logics axiomatized by path equations (globally) decidable?
The results established so far let us deduce other theorems of independent interest. They concern questions of pushing up decidability in the spirit of 7] . For monomodal logics this has proved to be a rather powerful method. For polymodal logics it would be most welcome to have analogous theorems, so that one can prove fmp or decidability for a polymodal logic by starting with the independent fusion of it's monomodal fragments and then adding one by one the postulates which mix the operators. For independent fusions these problems are largely solved in 8] . So what about pushing up properties for some non-trivial polymodal axioms? Secondly, adding master-or universal modalities is an important tool in applications for modal logics. The question which properties are preserved under the process of adding such a modality is quite an important one. We have already used a master modality to lower the bound for decidability. By that we have shown that they have a destructive force concerning decidability. These results are indepdendent of the special choice of the master. We could have taken a universal modality instead or add a postulate that the master is the (re exive) transitive closure of the other relations etc.
It is undecidable for bimodal Sq 1 logics whether adding D for one operator preserves decidability.
There are subframe logics with three operators which are decidable while the addition of a postulate of the form p ! p destroys decidability. There are bimodal subframe logics which are decidable, while their extension by a universal modality is not.
The last statement improves on 16] who showed that fmp can be lost under addition of the universal modality. The logic of 12] which we discussed above is another example of a logic for which decidability is lost when the universal modality is added. The proofs are easy. Start with T for an undecidable T. This is a subframe logic and decidable. Add one by one the postulates D for the individual operators. If both are added, decidability is lost. So at one point, adding D means losing decidability. If it is at the rst step, we could strengthen the theorem to read subframe logic rather than Sq 0 . For the second theorem use a similar argument. Here, however, the added axiom is a subframe axiom, so the property of being subframe logic is retained. For the last assertion notice that the decidability of a logic extended by a universal modality is equivalent to the global decidability of the original logic. (See 3].)
Notice that we have not established that global decidability for Thuelogics T is decidable. This could be answered via the following Question. Is it decidable for subframe logics whether adding the universal modality preserves decidability?
